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Pickelsimer: Attorney Malpractice in Will Drafting: Will South Carolina Expand
ATTORNEY MALPRACTICE IN WILL DRAFTING:
WILL SOUTH CAROLINA EXPAND PRIVITY
TO IMPOSE A DUTY TO INTENDED BENEFICIARIES OF A WILL?

1.

INTRODUCTION

In 1842, Winterbottom v. Wright' announced the English common law rule that
privity of contract must exist in order for a duty to extend to a third party.2 The
United States Supreme Court adopted this concept ofprivity thirty-seven years later
in Savings Bank v. Ward.' In Ward, the Court refused to hold an attorney who
erroneously certified that his client had good title to property liable for the damages
to the bank that relied on the attorney's certification.4 Instead, the Court found that,
absent fraud or collusion, an attorney is not liable to those who are not the
attorney's clients.5
Although the defense of privity began to fall in other areas of the law early in
the twentieth century, 6 the requirement for privity in legal malpractice cases stood
as an absolute barrier to liability to third parties until 1958.' Since then, the vast
majority of states, utilizing a variety of tests and factors, have abandoned the strict
privity requirement in legal malpractice cases.' South Carolina case law, however,
is silent as to whether a frustrated beneficiary has standing to bring an action for
legal malpractice against the attomey who drafted a will.9
Part II of this Comment begins by surveying South Carolina legal malpractice
case law, focusing on the requirement for privity between the attorney and the party
seeking to bring an action for malpractice and identifying the elements required to
state a claim for legal malpractice. Part III explores in detail the South Carolina
Court of Appeals's decision in Henkel v. Winn, emphasizing the opinion's failure

1. Winterbottom v. Wright, (1842) 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (Exch.).
2. Id. at 403.

3. 100 U.S. 195, 205-06 (1879).
4. See id. at 196, 207.
5. Id. at 205-06 ("Where there is fraud or collusion, the party will be held liable, even though
there is no privity of contract; but where there is neither fraud or collusion nor privity of contract, the
party will not be held liable, unless the act is one imminently dangerous to the lives of others, or is an
act performed in pursuance of some legal duty." (citing Langridge v. Levy, (1837) 150 Eng. Rep. 863,
866 (Exch.))).
6. See Bradley E.S. Fogel, Attorney v. Client-Privity,Malpractice, and the Lack of Respectfor
the Privacy of the Attorney-Client Relationship in Estate Planning,68 TENN. L. REv. 261, 269-70
(2001) (citing MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050, 1053 (N.Y. 1916) (holding a
manufacturer of a dangerous product owed a duty of care to the foreseeable users of its product
regardless of whether privity existed between the manufacturer and the user injured by the product)).
7. Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (en banc).
8. See generally 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFERY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 32.4 (2006
ed.) (discussing the prevailing rules and approaches to legal malpractice in will drafting and the privity
requirement).
9. Henkel v. Winn, 346 S.C. 14, 18 n.3, 550 S.E.2d 577, 579 n.3 (Ct. App. 2001) (identifying the
lack of precedent directly addressing this issue in South Carolina).
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to decide whether an attorney drafting a will owes a duty of care to intended
beneficiaries who are not in privity with the attorney." Part IV outlines the tests
other jurisdictions have used to answer the question raised in Henkel of attorney
liability to third parties. Part V applies these different tests to the facts in Henkel,
predicting the most likely outcome under each. Part VI forecasts that a South
Carolina court will probably adopt the Florida-Iowa rule in deciding whether
intended beneficiaries must be in privity with the drafting attorney to have standing
to bring a legal malpractice action based on the drafting and execution of a will.
Part VII concludes.
II.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF SOUTH CAROLINA LEGAL MALPRACTICE CASE LAW

In decisions consistent with the privity requirement established by the United
States Supreme Court in Savings Bank v. Ward," South Carolina courts have held
that attorneys acting in their professional capacity only owe a duty of care to their
clients. 12 The South Carolina Supreme Court has also refused to impose liability on
attorneys based on breach of an express warranty to obtain a specific result. 3
However, an attorney may be held liable "where, in addition to representing [the]
client, [the attorney] breaches some independent duty to a third person or acts in
[the attorney's] own personal interest, outside the scope of [the attorney's]
representation of the client."14
In South Carolina, "[t]o prevail in a legal malpractice claim, the plaintiff must
satisfy the following four elements: (1) the existence of an attorney-client
relationship; (2) breach of duty by the attorney; (3) damage to the client; and (4)
proximate causation of client's damage by the breach."' 5 As the court noted in
Henkel, South Carolina courts have not directly addressed whether an intended
beneficiary has standing to bring a legal malpractice action based on negligence in
drafting and executing a will. 6

10. Id.
11. 100 U.S. 195,205-06 (1879).
12. See Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 633 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2006) ("[A]n attorney is
immune from liability to third persons arising from the performance of his professional activities as an
attorney on behalf of and with the knowledge of his client." (quoting Gaar v. N. Myrtle Beach Realty
Co., 287 S.C. 525, 528, 339 S.E.2d 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1986))); Am. Fed. Bank v. No. One Main Joint
Venture, 321 S.C. 169, 174, 467 S.E.2d 439, 442 (1996) ("Before a claim for malpractice may be
asserted, there must exist an attorney-client relationship.").
13. Holy Loch Distribs., Inc. v. Hitchcock, 340 S.C. 20, 27, 531 S.E.2d 282, 286 (2000) (citing
Smith v. Haynsworth, Marion, McKay & Geurard, 322 S.C. 433, 436, 472 S.E.2d 612, 614 (1996)).
(finding that recovery under a "breach of express warranty theory would change the current standard
of care for attorneys" and "inhibit[] the frank discussion between attorney and client concerning the
merits of the case.").
14. Stiles v. Onorato, 318 S.C. 297, 300, 457 S.E.2d 601, 602 (1995).
15. Hitchcock, 340 S.C. at 26, 531 S.E.2d at 285 (citing Smith, 322 S.C. at 436, 472 S.E.2d at
614).
16. Henkel v. Winn, 346 S.C. 14, 18 n.3, 550 S.E.2d 577, 579 n.3 (Ct. App. 2001).
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I1I. THE COURT IDENTIFIES THE ISSUE, BUT LEAVES THE QUESTION OPEN IN HENKEL
V. WINN

A.

FactualBackground and ProceduralHistory

In Henkel, a widow brought a claim for legal malpractice against the attorneys
who drafted her husband's will. 7 The husband, who had an advanced stage of
cancer, and wife, who was pregnant with their first child, met with an attorney,
Winn, on two occasions to discuss "their estate plans and wills."' 8 Prior to the
second meeting, Winn asked Moore, another attorney in the firm, to assist in the
engagement.' 9 Seven days after the second meeting, Moore mailed a draft of the
wills, along with a cover letter, to the husband and wife."0
In her complaint, the wife asserted that her husband intended for her to receive
"specific bequests to her in addition to leaving her one-half of the probate assets.'
According to the wife, the husband instructed the attorneys to draft the will so that
she would "have received all of the couple's jointly owned property and the
proceeds from her husband's retirement plan and savings investment accounts plus
one-half of the life insurance proceeds, stocks and bonds, and his interest in the
marital home. 22 After the husband died eight months later and the will was
admitted for probate, the wife discovered the will left her only one-half of the
husband's estate as calculated for federal estate tax purposes. 23 She contended the
will did not effectuate her husband's intent and brought
a claim for professional
24
negligence against the attorneys who drafted the will.
The wife appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the
attorneys. 25 At trial, the court found that the "Husband's execution of the will
indicated he was aware of its content and nature;" the wife, who had read the letter
explaining her husband's will before his death, "was estopped from claiming that
the will was contrary to her husband's instructions" to the attorneys; and the wife's

17.
18.
19.
20.

Id.at 16,
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at 17, 550 S.E.2d at 578.
Id. at 15, 550 S.E.2d at 577.
Id.
The letter explained the following:
Robert leaves to Nancy that amount which, when added to the assets passing to
Nancy outside his Will (but not his tangible personal property), will equal onehalf of his estate ... I do want to remind you of the fact that your Wills will
operate only on the property in your probate estates. To the extent that property
passes directly to each other or to someone else in the form of insurance proceeds,
as jointly owned property with rights of survivorship and/or pursuant to
beneficiary designations under any employer or other plans, your Wills will not
operate on these assets. I believe we discussed the advisability of Robert naming
his estate as the beneficiary of part or all of his life insurance.
550 S.E.2d at 578.
Id.
Id. at 16-17, 550 S.E.2d at 578.
Id. at 16, 550 S.E.2d at 578.
See id.at 17, 550 S.E.2d at 578.
Id.
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"failure to inform [the] [a]ttorneys that the will and letter were inconsistent with
Husband's intent was an intervening and superseding cause of [her] injury."26

Although the attorneys argued that the wife did not have standing to bring the suit,
the trial court did not find it necessary to address this argument.27
B.

The PrivityArguments

On appeal, the attorneys reasserted their position that the wife lacked standing
to bring the action for negligence directly, citing cases from Maryland, Ohio,
Nebraska, New York, Texas, and Virginia.28 In response, the wife asserted that the
attorneys had established an attorney-client relationship between themselves and
both the husband and the wife. 29 The wife cited case law from other jurisdictions
and argued that the vast majority of those deciding the issue allow intended
beneficiaries to bring suit against attorneys who prepared a testator's will.3 °

The court in Henkel affirmed the decision of the trial court without addressing
the privity issue and found that the record did not establish any breach of duty on
the attorneys' part. 3 The court refused to consider extrinsic evidence in determining
whether the will accurately reflected the husband's testamentary intent.32 In a

footnote, the court briefly discussed but did not answer the question of whether the

26. Id.
27. Order at 9-10, Henkel v. Winn, No. 98-CP-23-4279 (Ct. C.P. County of Greenville Sept. 16,
1999) ("Defendants also argue that Plaintiff has no standing to bring a negligence action against
Defendants, since she was not in privity with the client of Defendants. They cite numerous cases from
other jurisdictions but acknowledge that there is not a South Carolina case on point. The Court finds
it unnecessary to address this issue.").
28. Final Brief for Respondents at 14-15, Henkel v. Winn, 346 S.C. 14, 550 S.E.2d 577 (Ct. App.
2001) (No. 98-CP-23-4279) ("While the law in South Carolina on this issue remains unsettled, the
Wyche law firm also maintains that its duty of care in the preparation of [the husband's] Will was to
[the husband] exclusively and not to [his wife] since she was not in privity with them.").
29. Reply Brief of Appellant at 4, Henkel v. Winn, 346 S.C. 14, 550 S.E.2d 577 (Ct. App. 2001)
(No. 98-CP-23-4279) (presenting the acts of the attorneys in addressing all correspondence to the
husband and wife jointly, billing the husband and wife jointly, and receiving payment from the husband
and wife's joint checking account as evidence that wife acted in privity with husband and attorneys).
30. Id. at 5-6 (citing Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 688 (Cal. 1961) (en banc); Biakanja v. Irving,
320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (en banc); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981); Licata v.
Spector, 225 A.2d 28, 31 (Conn. C.P. 1966); Ogle v. Fuiten, 466 N.E.2d 224, 227 (111. 1984); Jewish
Hosp. v. Boatmen's Nat'l Bank, 633 N.E.2d 1267, 1276 (111.App. Ct. 1994); Walker v. Lawson, 514
N.E.2d 629 (Ind.Ct. App. 1987), vacated, 526 N.E.2d 968 (Ind. 1988); Desire Narcotics Rehab. Ctr.,
Inc. v. White, 732 So. 2d 144, 146 (La. Ct. App. 1999); Johnson v. Sandier, Balkin, Hellman &
Weinstein, P.C., 958 S.W.2d 42, 48 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); Hesser v. Ctr. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of
Enid, 956 P.2d 864, 868 (Okla. 1998); Hale v. Groce, 730 P.2d 576, 577 (Or. Ct. App. 1986), rev'don
other grounds, 744 P.2d 1289 (Or. 1987); Persche v. Jones, 387 N.W.2d 32, 35-36 (S.D. 1986);
Schirmer v. Nethercutt, 288 P. 265, 267-68 (Wash. 1930); Auric v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 331 N.W.2d 325,
329 (Wis. 1983)).
31. Henkel, 346 S.C. at 18, 550 S.E.2d at 579.
32. Id. ("Because the will was duly executed and admitted for probate, we must presume the
Husband knew and understood its contents. Moreover, the testator's intent must be determined from
the will itself.").
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wife had standing to bring the action for legal malpractice.33 But the court of
appeals did indicate that a plaintiff may
have to be in privity with the attorney to
34
bring an action for legal malpractice.
IV.

THE CURRENT STATUS OF THE STRICT PRIVITY REQUIREMENT IN OTHER
JURISDICTIONS

While courts generally had held that testators and, more commonly, their
personal representatives had standing to bring a legal malpractice action against
attorneys for negligent will drafting,35 the absence of privity stood as an absolute
bar to actions brought by intended beneficiaries of wills based on the attomey's
negligence in drafting the will.36 In actions brought on behalf of the estate, courts
typically limited damages to either the fees paid to the attorney for drafting the will
or the cost of obtaining a new will which would adequately accomplish the
testator's intent.37 Because the estate was not injured, personal representatives
lacked standing to bring an action on behalf of intended beneficiaries of the will
who claimed an attomey's negligent will drafting frustrated the intent of the
testator.3t
Today only a minority of states adhere to the strict requirement of privity. The
vast majority of states have relaxed the privity requirement, allowing intended
beneficiaries standing to bring legal malpractice actions under a number of

33. Id. at 18 n.3, 550 S.E.2d at 579 n.3 ("Initially, we note that Wife may not have standing to
assert a claim for malpractice based on her husband's will. There is a split among other jurisdictions as
to whether a frustrated beneficiary can sue the will's drafter.").
34. Id. ("Although never addressed directly in South Carolina, related case law indicates that a
plaintiff in an attorney malpractice action may have to be in privity with the attorney.").
35. See generally MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 8, § 32.4 (discussing issues surrounding the
standing of personal representatives and beneficiaries of the estate to bring suit against attorneys for
negligent estate planning and will drafting).
36. See, e.g., Buckley v. Gray, 42 P. 900, 900 (Cal. 1895) (declining to allow liability to extend
to parties outside the attorney-client relationship), abrogatedby Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d 16 (Cal.
1958).
37. See, e.g., Heyer v. Flaig, 449 P.2d 161,167 n.6 (Cal. 1969) (noting that estates can only sue
for attorney's fees paid to attorneys who negligently draft wills); Rutter v. Jones, Blechman, Woltz &
Kelly, P.C., 568 S.E.2d 693,695 (Va. 2002) (finding the personal representative did not have standing
to bring an action against the attorney for malpractice resulting in adverse tax consequences to the estate
"because the cause of action for legal malpractice asserted ... did not come into existence during [the
testator's] lifetime and thus did not survive [the testator's] death"). But see Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend,
Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 787 (Tex. 2006) (finding personal representatives have standing
to bring an action for malpractice causing adverse tax consequences to the estate if they "demonstrate
that the decedent intended to minimize tax liability for the estate as a whole").
38. Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514, 521 (Ct. App. 1976) ("The executor of an estate
has no standing to bring an action for the amount of the bequest against an attorney who negligently
prepared the estate plan since, in the normal case, the estate is not injured by such negligence, except
to the extent of fees paid; only the beneficiaries suffer the real loss.").
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formulations, which include balancing tests, negligence actions based in tort, and
third-party beneficiary contract theories.39
A.

Jurisdictionsthat Have Moved Awayfrom the StrictPrivity Requirement

The jurisdictions that have eased the strict privity requirement typically use one
of the following three approaches to determine whether the intended beneficiary of
a will has standing to bring an action for legal malpractice:4" (1) the balancing of
factors test, which originated in California; 4 (2) "the Florida-Iowa rule;"4 and (3)
breach of contract based on a third-party beneficiary contract theory.43
1.

The Balancing ofFactors Test

The seminal case expanding privity to intended beneficiaries of wills is
Biakanja v. Irving." In Biakanja, the California Supreme Court overturned two
earlier cases in which it held third-party beneficiaries of wills did not have standing
to bring actions for legal malpractice because the attorneys were not in privity with
the third-party beneficiaries.45 In Biakanja, a notary prepared a will devising and
bequeathing all of the testator's property to the plaintiff.46 The will was denied
had failed to obtain proper attestation of the testator's
probate because the notary
47
signature on the will.
In overturning its prior decisions, the California Supreme Court cited the
growing number of jurisdictions moving away from the strict privity requirement
in other areas of the law.48 The court further noted that "[r]ecovery has been

39. Ronald R. Volkmer, Attorney Liability to Nonclients: The Need to Re-Examine Nebraska's
Privity Rule, 29 CREIGHTON L. REV. 295, 300 (1995) (quoting Bruce S. Ross, Legal Malpracticein
Estate Planning and Administration, 18 ACTEC NOTES 248, 250 (1993)) (reporting that many
jurisdictions in recent years moved away from the strict privity requirement and allow suits for
negligence in will drafting under the balancing of factors test, third-party beneficiary theory, or other
formulations).
40. Id.; see MALLEN & SMITH, supra note 8, § 32.4.
41. See Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 687 (Cal. 1961) (en banc).
42. See Bradley E.S. Fogel, Attorney v. Client-Privity,Malpractice,and the Lack ofRespectfor
the Privacyof the A ttorney-ClientRelationship in Estate Planning,68 TENN. L. REV. 261, 283 (2001).
43. See Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 751 (Pa. 1983).
44. 320 P.2d 16 (Cal. 1958) (en banc).
45. Id. at 19.
46. Id. at 17.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 18.
When Buckley v. Gray [ ] was decided in 1895, it was generally accepted that,
with the few exceptions noted in the opinion in that case, there was no liability for
negligence committed in the performance of a contract in the absence of privity.
Since that time the rule has been greatly liberalized, and the courts have permitted
a plaintiff not in privity to recover damages in many situations for the negligent
performance of a contract.
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allowed in some cases to a third party not in privity where the only risk of harm
49
created by the negligent performance of a contract was to an intangible interest.,
To determine on a case-by-case basis whether intended beneficiaries of a will
have standing to bring an action, the court set forth a multi-factor test:50
[T]he extent to which the transaction was intended to affect the
plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to him, the degree of certainty
that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of the connection
between the defendant's conduct and the injury suffered, the
moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct, and the policy
of preventing future harm. 5'
In applying the factors and finding the facts in Biakanja sufficient to support
extending privity to allow the plaintiff standing to recover, the court concluded that
"the 'end and aim' of the transaction was to provide for the passing of [the
testator's] estate to plaintiff' and that the terms of the will made it foreseeable that
the plaintiff would experience a loss "if faulty solemnization caused the will to be
invalid."52
Although Biakanjainvolved a notary,53 the California Supreme Court extended
its holding to apply to attorneys in Lucas v. Hamm.54 In explaining the policy
behind its holding, the court made the following statement about estate planning
and wills:
[T]he main purpose of the testator in making his agreement with
the attorney is to benefit the persons named in [the] will and this
intent can be effectuated, in the event of a breach by the attorney,
only by giving the beneficiaries a right of action, [and] we should
recognize, as a matter of policy, that they are entitled to recover
as third-party beneficiaries. 5

49. Id. (construing Glanzer v. Shepard, 135 N.E. 275 (N.Y. 1922)).
50. Id.at 19 ("The determination whether in a specific case the defendant will be held liable to
a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and involves the balancing of various factors ... .
51. Id.
52. Id. ("As [the testator] died without revoking his will, [the] plaintiff, but for [the] defendant's
negligence, would have received all of the [testator's] estate, and the fact that [the plaintiff] received
only one-eighth of the estate was directly caused by [the] defendant's conduct.").
53. Biakanja also involved a criminal violation for the unauthorized practice of law, which may
explain why the court included the fifth element of the test-moral blame associated with the conduct.
See id.
54. 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961) (en banc) ("We conclude that intended beneficiaries of a will
who lose their testamentary rights because of failure of the attorney who drew the will to properly fulfill
his obligations under his contract with the testator may recover as third-party beneficiaries.").
55. Id.
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The court in Lucas cited Biakanja for the factors used to determine whether a
defendant should be found in privity with a third-party, excluding (for no stated
reason) the fifth factor-the moral blame attached to the defendant's conduct.56
In the years following Biakanja and Lucas, a number of other jurisdictions
adopted the balancing of factors test and eliminated the strict privity requirement
in legal malpractice actions brought by intended beneficiaries.5 7 In Donahue v.
Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy,P. C., the Missouri Supreme Court moved away from

a strict privity requirement in attorney malpractice cases and adopted a modified
version of the balancing of factors test established in Biakanja and Lucas, 8
reconciling the balancing of factors test and third-party beneficiary contract theory:
The two most common approaches do not appear to be
irreconcilable. The first factor of the balancing test addresses the
extent to which the transaction was intended to benefit the
plaintiff and bears a remarkable resemblance to the third party
beneficiary theory. The question of whether the client had a
specific intent to benefit the plaintiff plays an important role in
determining if a legal duty exists under the balancing of factors
test. The first factor ... should be modified to reflect that the

factor weighs in favor of a legal duty by an attorney where the
client specifically intended to benefit the plaintiffs. With that
modification, that approach is an appropriate method for
determining an attorney's duty to non-clients.59
The court reasoned that the modified balancing of factors test negated arguments
suggesting that allowing suits by those not in privity would extend liability to
unlimited classes of potential plaintiffs and would infringe upon the attorney-client
relationship.6" The fact that the test emphasized a specific intent to benefit a
particular intended beneficiary sufficiently limited the group ofpossible plaintiffs.6
Thus, the court adopted a modified balancing of factors test with a special emphasis
on the first factor--"the existence of a specific intent by the client that the purpose
of the attorney's services were to benefit the plaintiffs."62

56. Id. at 687 (citing Biakanja, 320 P.2d at 19).
57. See, e.g., Pizel v. Zuspann, 795 P.2d 42, 51 (Kan. 1990) ("We find the California cases
persuasive. We conclude that an attorney may be liable to parties not in privity based upon the
balancing test developed by the California courts."); see also Fickett v. Super. Ct., 558 P.2d 988, 990
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1976) ("We are of the opinion that the better view is that the determination of whether,
in a specific case, the attorney will be held liable to a third person not in privity is a matter of policy and
involves the balancing of various factors...."); Donahue v. Shughart, Thomson & Kilroy, P.C., 900
S.W.2d 624, 629 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) ("[T]he question of legal duty of attorneys to non-clients will
be determined by weighing the factors in the modified balancing test.").
58. 900 S.W.2d at 629.
59. Id. at 628 (italics also bolded in original).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 629 (emphasis added).
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2.

The Florida-IowaRule

The Florida-Iowa rule actually developed from the California Court of
Appeals's opinion in Ventura County Humane Society v. Holloway,63 which was
decided several years after Biakanja and Lucas.64 In Ventura County Humane
Society, the attorney drafted a will that included an ambiguous bequest to the
"SOCIETY FOR THE PREVENTION OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS (Local or
National). '65 The plaintiffs and other humane societies filed claims in probate court,
requiring a lengthy hearing to determine the merits of the claims, which resulted in
extensive legal expenses and delayed distributions from the estate.66 Despite finding
the plaintiffs had standing to bring the action under the balancing of factors test
established in Biakanja and Lucas, the court determined that "an attorney may be
held liable to the testamentary beneficiaries only . . . if due to the attorney's
professional negligence the testamentary intent expressed in the will is frustrated
and the beneficiaries clearly67 designated by the testator lose their legacy as a direct
result of such negligence.
Although Ventura County Humane Society has not been overruled,68 a later
decision by the California Court of Appeals limited the rule to cases where
ambiguities in the will are the result of the testator providing poor instructions to
the drafting attorney. 69 Florida and Iowa courts, however, adopted the holding in
Ventura County Humane Society and established the Florida-Iowa rule for
determining when intended beneficiaries have standing to assert claims for legal
malpractice. 7" The Florida-Iowa rule limits the focus to the testamentary intent "as

63. 115 Cal. Rptr. 464 (1974).
64. See Fogel, supra note 42, at 283.
65. Ventura County, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 466.
66. Id.at 466-67.
67. Id.at 468 (emphasis omitted).
68. Fogel, supra note 42, at 284.
69. See Bucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514, 520 (Ct. App. 1976) ("Any reliance on Ventura
is misplaced as that case is readily distinguishable on its facts. There, the alleged error was an
ambiguous designation of the beneficiaries. The beneficiaries, however, were designated exactly in the
manner specified by the testator ....).
70. Fogel, supra note 42, at 283.
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expressed in the will,"' consequently barring the use of extrinsic evidence to
contradict the testator's intent as expressed in the will."

For example, in the Florida case Arnold v. Carmichael,a client contacted an
attorney to modify and replace a will that had been prepared by another attorney.73
The attorney redrafted the will, making the changes the client requested, and left
it with his secretary without reading the will after the secretary had entered the
changes.74 In redrafting the will, the attorney negligently omitted a residuary clause

contained in the previous will, resulting in the division of the residuary estate
among eleven heirs of the testatrix instead of the two plaintiffs the testatrix
intended. 75 The Arnold court found that the attorney was negligent in failing to read

the will before the testatrix executed it and "[the attorney's negligence] was a
proximate cause of the [plaintiffs'] lOSS. '' 76In reaching this conclusion, the Arnold
court relied on an affidavit from the attorney who drafted the second will in which
he admitted that he did not review the will after having it prepared or before the
testatrix signed it. 77 The court noted that the attorney's affidavit "supplied evidence

independent of the testimony of
the intended beneficiaries to show that the
7

testatrix's intent was frustrated.,

1

The focus of the Florida-Iowa rule on the testamentary intent as expressed in
the will prevents it from opening the door to malpractice liability to every frustrated
beneficiary. For example, in Stept v. Paoli,79 frustrated beneficiaries of a trust filed
a legal malpractice action alleging that the attorneys' negligence in drafting a trust
caused the beneficiaries to pay over $100,000 in federal estate taxes. 80 The trial
court, relying on Florida precedent, dismissed the complaint, finding the plaintiffs
had no cause of action for legal malpractice because the trust "did not contain the

71. DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) ("An attorney preparing
a will has a duty not only to the testator-client, but also to the testator's intended beneficiaries, who may
maintain a legal malpractice action against the attorney on theories of either tort (negligence) or contract
(as third-party beneficiaries). However, liability to the testamentary beneficiary can arise only if, due
to the attorney's professional negligence, the testamentary intent, as expressed in the will, is frustrated,
and the beneficiary's legacy is lost or diminished as a direct result of that negligence.") (citation
omitted); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 1987) ("[W]e hold a cause of action
ordinarily will arise only when as a direct result of the lawyer's professional negligence the testator's
intent as expressed in the testamentary instruments is frustrated in whole or in part and the beneficiary's
interest in the estate is either lost, diminished, or unrealized.").
72. See Arnold v. Carmichael, 524 So. 2d 464,466-67 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) ("In the context
before the court ... the proper concern appears to be simply to limit or prevent liability (under the
privity exception) based on evidence of testamentary intent in conflict with the express terms of a
validly executed will.").
73. Id at 465-66.
74. See id. at 466.
75. See id.at 465, 466.
76. Id.at 467.
77. See id.at 466, 467.
78. Id.at 467.
79. 701 So. 2d 1228 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997).
80. Id.at 1229.
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expressed intent of the testator to avoid or minimize taxes."'" In Stept the court

affirmed the trial court's decision, emphasizing that "[t]he Supreme Court of
Florida observed that although the rule of privity has been relaxed in will drafting
instances, it is only relaxed
to the extent that the testamentary intent expressed in
82
the will is frustrated.

Additionally, Florida courts have refused to grant intended beneficiaries
standing to bring malpractice actions against drafting attorneys for legal fees the
beneficiaries incurred to resolve ambiguities in trusts.83 For example, in O'Neill v.
Sacher, the beneficiary of a pour over trust filed an action for legal malpractice
against the attorney who drafted the trust to recover legal fees and costs incurred

in a lawsuit filed to clarify an ambiguity in the trust. 84 In denying the beneficiary's
claim for malpractice, the court explained the following:

[W]e recognized-as a narrow exception to the general
requirement that an attorney has no duty to a non-client-that an
attorney may be liable to a testamentary beneficiary where the
testamentary intent, as expressed in the will, is frustrated due to
professional negligence with a resulting loss or diminution of the
beneficiary's legacy. Although the beneficiary's costly lawsuit

was spawned by an ambiguity in the testamentary instruments, it
was not established that imprecision in draftmanship caused a
frustration of the testator's intent as expressed in the will and trust
documents."
Michigan and Maryland courts have followed the Florida-Iowa rule and reached
similar conclusions. In Micras v. DeBona,86 the Michigan Supreme Court refused

to look "beyond the four comers of the will" and denied the plaintiffs claim for
negligent will drafting where the lawyer, despite having followed the testator's

81. Id.(citing Kinney v. Shinholser, 663 So. 2d 643, 646 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)); accord
Angel, Cohen & Rogovin v. Oberon Invest., N.V., 512 So. 2d 192, 194 (Fla. 1987) (citing Biakanja v.
Irving, 320 P.2d 16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (en banc)) ("For the beneficiaries' action in negligence to fall within
the exception to the privity requirement, testamentary intent as expressed in the will must be frustrated
by the attorney's negligence and as a direct result of such negligence the beneficiaries' legacy is lost
or diminished. We see no reason to expand this limited exception and specifically reject the invitation
to adopt California's balancing of factors test.").
82. Stept, 701 So. 2d at 1229 (citation omitted). ContraBucquet v. Livingston, 129 Cal. Rptr. 514,
519-20 (Ct. App. 1976) (finding standing for the plaintiff to bring an action for legal malpractice under
the California balancing of factors test in facts analogous to Stept).
83. See, e.g., O'Neill v. Sacher, 526 So. 2d 771, 772 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) ("[W]here an
ambiguity in testamentary instruments drafted by an attorney does not result in a frustration of
testamentary intent there is no liability to a non-client.").
84. Id.;
see also O'Neill v. Sacher, 451 So. 2d 1032, 1033 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984) ("At the heart
of this litigation is a conflict among provisions of the daughter's 1974 trust, the mother's will and the
codicil to the mother's will concerning the responsibility to pay expenses for the Plantation Key
residence while Mr. Austin lives there.").
85. O'Neill, 526 So. 2d at 772.
86. 550 N.W.2d 202 (Mich. 1996).
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intent by disinheriting the testator's daughter, failed to exercise a general power of
appointment to exclude the daughter as a beneficiary of the testator's marital trust., 7
Simliarly, in Kirgan v. Parks,s5 the Maryland Supreme Court held that no cause of
action for malpractice existed when "the will is valid, the testamentary intent as
carried out, and there is no concession of error by the
expressed in the will8 has
9 been
[drafting] attorney.
3.

The Third-PartyBeneficiary Contract Theory

The balancing of factors test, although grounded in tort law, provides a remedy
similar to the third-party beneficiary approach, which is based on contract law.9"
Unlike jurisdictions allowing intended beneficiaries standing to bring actions under
tort or contract theories, 91 attorneys in jurisdictions adopting tests based on thirdparty beneficiary contract law are only liable to non-clients when the "primary
purpose behind the establishment of the attorney-client relationship is to benefit the
non-client." 92

In Pelham v. Griesheimer,the Illinois Supreme Court, after finding the primary
purpose of the attorney-client relationship was an action for divorce, refused to
extend the attorney's duty to the children who asserted the attorney was negligent

for not ensuring they were named beneficiaries of the couple's life insurance
policies. 93 The court found that extending a duty to non-clients could create

conflicts which would interfere with the attorney-client relationship. 94
In Guy v. Liederbach,95 an attorney allowed a beneficiary to sign the will as a
witness, thereby voiding the bequest to the beneficiary.96 The court rejected the

balancing of factors test and tort causes of action and held that the beneficiary's
cause of action against the attorney for malpractice could only exist under third-

87. Id. at 203-04, 209 ( "Plaintiffs' claims depend[ed] on extrinsic evidence beyond the four
comers of the will").
88. 478 A.2d 713 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1984).
89. Id. at 718-19 ("Where the language of a will is plain and unambiguous, no extrinsic evidence
is admissible to show that the testator's intention was different from that which the will discloses...
90. See MALLEN & SMITH, supranote 8, § 32.4.
91. See, e.g., Blair v. Lawrence N.C. ING, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw. 2001) ("Therefore, we hold
that, where the relationship between an attorney and a non-client is such that we would recognize a duty
of care, the non-client may proceed under either negligence or contract theories of recovery.").
92. Craig D. Martin, Comment, Liability ofAttorneys to Non-Clients: When Does a Duty to NonClients Arise?, 23 J. LEGAL PROF. 273, 275-76 (1999); accordPelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96,
100 (Ill. 1982) ("[Flor a nonclient to succeed in a negligence action against an attorney, he must prove
that the primary purpose and intent of the attorney-client relationship itself was to benefit or influence
the third party. Under such proof, recovery may be allowed, provided that the other elements of a
negligence cause of action can be proved." (citing Comment, Liability ofLawyers to Third Partiesfor
ProfessionalNegligence in Oregon, 60 OR. L. REV. 375, 385 (1981))).
93. 440 N.E.2d at 97, 101.
94. See id. at 101.
95. 459 A.2d 744 (Pa. 1983).
96. Id. at 747.
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Utilizing the third-party beneficiary analysis from the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts section 302(1),9 the court adopted a two-part test to determine when a

beneficiary has standing to enforce the attorney-client contract through an action
for legal malpractice. °° In order for a beneficiary to have standing under the
Pennsylvania rule, the beneficiary must prove enforcement of the contract is
"appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties" and that the client intended
1
"to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance."''
The holding in Guy and the language of section 302(1) are consistent with the
10 2
language in section 51 of the Restatement (Third)oftheLaw GoverningLawyers,

which imposes the following duty of care on attorneys:
[A] lawyer owes a duty to use care...
(3) to a nonclient when and to the extent that:
(a) the lawyer knows that a client intends as one of the

primary objectives of the representation that the lawyer's
services benefit the nonclient;
(b) such a duty would not significantly impair the
lawyer's performance of obligations to the client; and
(c) the absence of such a duty would make enforcement
3
of those obligations to the client unlikely ... 1.0

Thus, the Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, although much
narrower in scope than the Restatement (Second) of Contracts,concurs with the
Pennsylvania rule from Guy and with otherjurisdictions that have allowed liability
based on a third-party beneficiary contract theory.

97. Id.at 752 ("[Allthough a plaintiff on a third party beneficiary theory in contract may in some
cases have to show a deviation from the standard of care, as in negligence, to establish breach, the class
of persons to whom the defendant may be liable is restricted by principles of contract law, not
negligence principles relating to foreseeability or scope of the risk.").
98. Id. at 753.
99. Id.at 751.
(1)Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a beneficiary of a
promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition of a right to performance in the
beneficiary is appropriate to effectuate the intention of the parties and either (a)
the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of the promisee to pay
money to the beneficiary; or (b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee
intends to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1979).
100. See Guy, 459 A.2d at 751-52.
101. Id.at 751, 752 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (1998).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 51 (3)(a)-(c).
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While Pennsylvania declined to extend privity to allow for tort based actions,
some states allow plaintiffs to bring actions based in contract, tort, or both.' °4 In
Stowe v. Smith, the testator hired an attorney to prepare a will that would place half
of her estate in trust to be distributed to the plaintiff once he reached fifty years of
age, but if the plaintiff died before turning fifty, the plaintiff's issue would receive
the trust's assets. 15 The attorney prepared the will and informed the testator that it
comported with her instructions. 10 6 Relying on the attorney's representations, the
testator signed the will without reading it. 0 7 The testator died six days after
executing the will. 0 8 After the will was admitted to probate, the plaintiff learned the
attorney had erroneously drafted the will in such a manner that the assets of the
trust were to be distributed to the plaintiff's issue when the plaintiff attained the age
fifty rather than to the plaintiff.'0 9 After appealing the probate of the will based on
the attorney's negligence, the plaintiff entered a settlement in which he received
three-quarters of the share the testator had intended the plaintiff to receive.'' 0
In Stowe, the issue was not whether the testator's intent as expressed in the will
was frustrated or whether the will was defective. Instead, the question was whether
the beneficiary, despite the validity of the will, had standing to bring an action
against the attorney whose negligence frustrated the testator's intended effect of the
will." The court found that the intended beneficiary had standing to bring the
action:
If the [attorney] thwarted the wishes of the testatrix, an intended
beneficiary would also suffer an injury in that after the death of
the testatrix the failure of her testamentary scheme would deprive
the beneficiary of an intended bequest. It therefore follows that
the benefit which the plaintiff would have received under a will
prepared in accordance with the contract is so directly and closely
connected with the benefit which the [attorney] promised to the
testatrix that under the allegations of the
complaint the plaintiff
2
would be able to enforce the contract." 1

104. See, e.g., Blair v. Lawrence N.C. ING, 21 P.3d 452, 464 (Haw. 2001) (allowing recovery
under actions based in contract or tort); Stowe v. Smith, 441 A.2d 81, 84 (Conn. 1981) (allowing both
contract and tort actions) (citations omitted).
105. Stowe, 441 A.2d at 82.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. See id. at 84 ("Because no invalidity appears on the face of the will, the present case may
very well present greater obstacles to recovery than cases in which intended beneficiaries brought
actions against attorneys who prepared ineffective wills.").
112. Id. at 83 (citing 4 ARTHUR LINTON CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS §§ 782, 786 (1951); 2
SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 357 (3d. ed. 1959)).
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B. JurisdictionsMaintainingStrict Privity
Despite the move away from strict privity that began in California in the 1960s,
a number of states have held fast to the strict privity requirement in legal
malpractice actions. 3 Courts in these jurisdictions have refused to allow non-client
intended beneficiaries standing to bring malpractice actions under any theory of
recovery.

For example, New York maintains a clear rule that attorneys are not liable to
third parties for professional negligence absent fraud, maliciousness, or collusion." 4
In Viscardi v. Lerner,the plaintiffs contended the attorney's negligence in drafting
the testator's will destroyed their inheritance." 5 The plaintiffs argued that had the
will been drafted as the testator intended, they would have inherited one-half of the
estate as residuary beneficiaries.1 6 As evidence of the testator's true intent, the
plaintiffs introduced handwritten instructions from the testator to his attorneys.' 17
The court in Viscardi "decline[d] to depart from the firmly established privity

requirement in order to create a specific exception for an attorney's negligence in
will drafting" and held that "dismissal of the complaint was proper on the basis of
of privity between the plaintiffs and the [attorneys] who drafted the subject
the lack
1
will.' 18

New York courts have upheld the strict privity requirement in denying claims
brought by the estate and beneficiaries when an attorney's failure to properly direct
the execution of a will resulted in failure of part of the will." 9 Likewise, a New
York court, using the term "privity" as a term of art to mean the attorney-client
relationship rather than contractual privity,'20 found that a law firm that represented

113. Mali v. De Forest & Duer, 553 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (App. Div. 1990) (citing Viscardi v.
Lerner, 510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (App. Div. 1986); Rossi v. Boehner, 498 N.Y.S.2d 318, 318-19 (App.
Div. 1986)) (holding that attorneys "are not liable to the beneficiaries of such will or other third parties
not in privity who might be harmed by their professional negligence"); Barcelo v. Elliot, 923 S.W.2d
575, 578 (Tex. 1996) ("[T]he greater good is served by preserving a bright-line privity rule which
denies a cause of action to all beneficiaries whom the attorney did not represent.").
114. Mali, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (citing Viscardi, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 185; Rossi, 498 N.Y.S.2d at
318); Estate of Spivey v. Pulley, 526 N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (App. Div. 1988). But see Crossland Say. FSB
v. Rockwood Ins. Co., 700 F. Supp. 1274,1282, 1284 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (allowing a third party to bring
a legal malpractice action "[w]hen a lawyer at the direction of her client prepares an opinion letter
which is addressed to the third party or which expressly invites the third party's reliance.").
115. Viscardi, 510 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Estate of Spivey, 526 N.Y.S.2d at 146, 147 ("[S]ince the decedent's estate suffered no
pecuniary loss by virtue of the alleged malpractice and since.., there existed no privity between it and
the defendant ... the decedent's estate possesses no cause of action against the defendant in its own
right.").
120. See Mali v. De Forest & Duer, 553 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (App. Div. 1990). Privity is defined
as "[t]he connection or relationship between two parties, each having a legally recognized interest in
the same subject matter... ; mutuality of interest." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1237 (8th ed. 2004).
"[P]rivity of Contract" is defined as "[t]he relationship between the parties to a contract, allowing them
to sue each other but preventing a third party from doing so." Id.
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the family in estate planning and other matters was not in privity with the plaintiff
with respect to the will where the firm prepared the will for the plaintiff's father,
under which the plaintiff was the personal representative and a beneficiary. 2' Even
when the beneficiaries of the will arranged for and paid for the attorney's services,
New York declined to find the beneficiaries had standing to sustain an action
against the attorney for malpractice.' 22
Unlike these New York cases that summarily dismiss arguments for relaxed
privity, in Barcelo v. Elliott,'23 the Texas Supreme Court detailed the approaches
of other jurisdictions and its reasons for rejecting them. 2 4 In Barcelo, the plaintiffs,
who were remainder beneficiaries under a trust the probate court had found invalid,
sued the attorney who drafted the trust for malpractice, claiming the attorney's
"negligence caused the trust to be invalid, resulting in foreseeable injury to the
plaintiffs."' 25
The court in Barcelorejected the broad cause of action created by the balancing
of factors test because "[s]uch a cause of action would subject attorneys to suits by
heirs who simply did not receive what they believed to be their due share under the
will or trust."'2 6 The court further reasoned that "potential tort liability to third
parties would create a conflict during the estate planning process, dividing the
attorney's loyalty between his or her client and the third-party beneficiaries."' 27
The court further expressed concern about eroding the policy underpinning the
rule of strict privity.'2 8Although some jurisdictions "limited the cause of action to
beneficiaries specifically identified in an invalid will or trust," the Barcelo court
found that a number of situations may arise which could create conflict between the
beneficiary's interests and the interests of the client.' 9
The Barcelo court also refused to allow actions for legal malpractice based on
a third-party beneficiary contract theory because in Texas legal malpractice actions
are grounded in tort. 30 The Texas Supreme Court then reaffirmed its "bright-line
privity rule which denies a cause of action to all beneficiaries whom the attorney
did not represent" in order to "ensure that attorneys may in all cases zealously

121. Mali, 553 N.Y.S.2d at 392 (finding that, although the law firm represented the plaintiff and
"were long time legal advisors to the entire family," the plaintiff was not in privity with the firm with
regard to the will).
122. Conti v. Polizzotto, 663 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (App. Div. 1997).
123. 923 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. 1996).
124. Id. at 577-79.
125. Id. at 576.
126. Id. at 578.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. ("Suppose, for example, that a properly drafted will is simply not executed at the time
of the testator's death. The document may express the testator's true intentions, lacking signatures solely
because of the attorney's negligent delay. On the other hand, the testator may have postponed execution
because of second thoughts regarding the distribution scheme. In the latter situation, the attorney's
representation of the testator will likely be affected if he or she knows that the existence of an
unexecuted will may create malpractice liability if the testator unexpectedly dies.").
130. Id. at 579.

https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol58/iss3/8

16

Pickelsimer: Attorney Malpractice in Will Drafting: Will South Carolina Expand
ESTATE & FAMILY LAW
2007]

represent their clients without the threat of suit from third parties compromising that
representation." 3 '
Ohio and Nebraska, like New York and Texas, have maintained the strict
privity requirement for legal malpractice actions. 31 2 Consistent with the reasoning
of the Texas Supreme Court in Barcelo, in Simon v. Zipperstein,the Ohio Supreme

Court explained an attorney's obligation "is to direct his attention to the needs of
the client, not to the needs of a third party not in privity with the client."' 33
V.

ANALYZING THE FACTS OF HENKEL V. WINN UNDER THE DOMINANT TESTS

In Henkel, the South Carolina Court of Appeals noted that whether an intended

beneficiary has standing to bring an action for legal malpractice for negligent will
drafting was an issue of first impression in South Carolina.'34 The court, however,
declined to address the issue and decided the case on other grounds.' 35 This Part

applies the tests for standing discussed in Part IV-the balancing of factors test, the
Florida-Iowa rule, the third-party beneficiary contract theory, and strict privity
requirement-to the facts in Henkel and attempts to predict both the likely outcome
under each test and which approach the South Carolina Supreme Court will
probably adopt in deciding the question in the future.'36
A.

Henkel Under the Balancing of Factors Test

Under the balancing of factors test, courts evaluate "the extent to which the
transaction was intended to affect the plaintiff, the foreseeability of harm to [the
plaintiff], the degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, the closeness of
the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury, and the policy of

131. Id.at 578-79.
132. See Lilyhorn v. Dier, 335 N.W.2d 544,555 (Neb. 1983) (citing St. Mary's Church v. Tomek,
325 N.W.2d 164, 165 (Neb. 1982)) (holding the duties lawyers owe clients in will drafting do not
extend to third parties); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987) ("It is by now wellestablished in Ohio that an attorney may not be held liable by third parties as a result of having
performed services on behalf of a client, in good faith, unless the third party is in privity with the client
for whom the legal services were performed, or unless the attorney acts with malice."). But see Belt v.
Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 789 (Tex. 2006) (recognizing that
"precluding both beneficiaries and personal representatives from bringing suit for estate-planning
malpractice would essentially immunize estate-planning attorneys from liability for breaching their duty
to their clients[,]" and finding that allowing personal representatives to bring legal malpractice suits on
behalf of estates in estate planning "strikes the appropriate balance between providing accountability
for attorney negligence and protecting the sanctity of the attorney-client relationship").
133. Simon, 512 N.E.2d at 638.
134. 346 S.C. 14, 18 n.3, 550 S.E.2d 577, 579 n.3 (Ct. App. 2001).
135. Id.
136. Note that a court applying any of these tests will determine whether a frustrated will
beneficiary has standing to bring an action based on the pleadings, see S.C. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6); if the
pleadings are sufficient to survive demurrer, after limited factual determination during discovery, see
S.C. R. Civ. P. 56.
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preventing future harm."' 37 In Henkel, the testator intended the transaction (the will)
to benefit the plaintiff, his children, and his sisters.'38 In fact, the will did confer a
benefit on the plaintiff, although not to the extent the plaintiff contended the testator
intended. 3 9
The foreseeability of harm to the intended beneficiary was minimal in Henkel.
According to the record, the attorneys mailed the will and a cover letter explaining
the will to the plaintiff and the testator so each could review the will before
executing it. 14 Thus, the facts in Henkel support the conclusion that the attomeys
acted to ensure the testator understood the effect of the will and to minimize the risk
of harm or mistake. Consequently, harm to the plaintiff was far from certain.
The trial court, rather than the appellate court, addressed the factor of the
closeness of the connection between the defendant's conduct and the injury
suffered. The trial court found the plaintiff's and the testator's failure to object to
the will before the testator's death was an intervening and superseding cause of the
plaintiffs injury.141
The testator in Henkel reviewed and executed a will and later amended the will,
which was admitted to probate after the testator's death. 142 As a result, allowing the
plaintiff beneficiary standing to bring an action for malpractice would serve little
purpose in preventing future harm. Thus, it seems unlikely that a court applying the
balancing of factors test would find the plaintiff in Henkel had standing to bring an
action for legal malpractice. However, a court utilizing this test might still grant the
plaintiff standing to bring an action for malpractice because some courts applying
the test have emphasized the test's first factor-the extent to which the transaction
was intended to affect the plaintiff. 43 The facts in Henkel undoubtedly satisfy the
first factor.
B.

Henkel Under the Florida-IowaRule

If a South Carolina court were to apply the Florida-Iowa rule, plaintiffs like
Henkel would not have standing to bring an action for legal malpractice. Under this
rule, "liability to the testamentary beneficiary can arise only if, due to the attorney's
professional negligence, the testamentary intent, as expressed in the will, is
frustrated, and the beneficiary's legacy is lost or diminished as a direct result of that
negligence."'" The Henkel court found the express language of the will was clear
137. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685,687 (Cal. 1961) (en banc) (citing Biakanja v. Irving, 320 P.2d
16, 19 (Cal. 1958) (en banc)).
138. Henkel, 346 S.C. at 16-17, 550 S.E.2d at 578.
139. Id. at 16, S.E.2d at 578.
140. Id.
141. See Order, supra note 27, at 9; Henkel, 346 S.C. at 16, 550 S.E.2d at 578.
142. Henkel, 346 S.C. at 16, 550 S.E.2d at 578.
143. See, e.g., Fogel, supranote 42, at 282 ("Even though 'intent to affect' is merely on of the six
Lucas factors, courts following Lucas rely most heavily on this factor.").
144. DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Schreiner v. Scoville, 410
N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 1987) ("[W]e hold a cause of action ordinarily will arise only when as a direct
result of the lawyer's professional negligence the testator's intent as expressed in the testamentary
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and unambiguous."' Therefore, a South Carolina court applying the Florida-Iowa
rule will refuse to consider extrinsic evidence offered by plaintiffs to show the
testator's intent was anything other than the intent expressed in the will, effectively
precluding plaintiffs from presenting extensive evidence to support their claims.
C. Henkel Under the Third-party Beneficiary Contract Theory
To succeed in jurisdictions applying the third-party beneficiary contract theory,
a beneficiary must prove enforcement of the contract is "appropriate to effectuate
the intention of the parties" and that the client intended "to give the beneficiary the
benefit of the promised performance."14 6 The limited facts developed in Henkel do
not lend themselves to an evaluation under this theory. Because the court found the
will controlling and free of latent defects, it refused to consider extrinsic evidence
of the testator's intent. 147 Accordingly, under these limited facts, the first prong of
the test would fail because there was no tangible evidence that the will did not
effectuate the testator's true intent.
D. Henkel Under the Strict Privity Requirement
States adhering to a strict privity requirement maintain that attorneys are not
liable to third parties for professional negligence absent fraud, maliciousness, or
collusion.'48 In South Carolina, "an attorney is immune from liability to third
persons arising from the performance of his professional activities as an attorney
on behalf of and with the knowledge of his client."' 49
In Henkel, the plaintiff did not claim the attorneys committed fraud, acted
maliciously, or participated in a conspiracy in order to deprive her of the benefit she
believed the testator intended her to receive. 50 Furthermore, under the strict privity
requirement, an attorney-client relationship must exist between the plaintiff and the

instruments is frustrated in whole or in part and the beneficiary's interest in the estate is either lost,
diminished, or unrealized.").
145. Henkel, 346 S.C. at 19, 550 S.E.2d at 579 ("Because the will was properly executed and
probated, we find that [the plaintiff] cannot establish that [the testator's] intent was anything other than
as expressed in [the] will.").
146. Guy v. Liederbach, 459 A.2d 744, 751, 752 (Pa. 1983) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 302(1) (1979)).
147. Henkel, 346 S.C. at 19, 550 S.E.2d at 579 ("A will evidences the testator's intent at the
moment of execution and may differ dramatically from statements he or she may have made in the past.
Therefore, extrinsic evidence of intent may not be considered absent a latent ambiguity in the will.")
(footnote omitted).
148. See Mali v. De Forest, 553 N.Y.S.2d 391, 392 (App. Div. 1990) (citing Viscardi v. Lemer,
510 N.Y.S.2d 183, 185 (App. Div. 1986); Rossi v. Boehner, 498 N.Y.S.2d 318, 318-19 (App. Div.
1986)); Simon v. Zipperstein, 512 N.E.2d 636, 638 (Ohio 1987).
149. Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 564, 633 S.E.2d 505, 509 (2006) (quoting Gaar v. N.
Myrtle Beach Realty Co., 287 S.C. 525,528, 339 S.E.2d 887, 889 (Ct. App. 1986)); see Am. Fed. Bank
v. No. One Main Joint Venture, 321 S.C. 169, 174, 467 S.E.2d 439, 442 (1996) ("Before a claim for
malpractice may be asserted, there must exist an attorney-client relationship.").
150. Henkel, 346 S.C. at 17, 550 S.E.2d at 578.
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attorney in order for the plaintiff to have standing to bring an action for legal
malpractice.'15 Although a plaintiff, such as in Henkel, may allege attorneys were
engaged to jointly represent the plaintiff and the testator, authority from strict
appears
privity jurisdictions suggests that some courts may strictly construe what
152
to be joint representation as separate engagements with regard to wills.
VI. THE APPROACH SOUTH CAROLINA COURTS WILL LIKELY ADOPT

A South Carolina court addressing the issue of attorney liability to third party
beneficiaries would probably adopt the Florida-Iowa rule. In essence, Henkel is an
example of an application of the Florida-Iowa rule. The court in Henkel, like courts
following the Florida-Iowa rule, refused to look beyond the four comers of the will
for a contrary intent of the testator because the will, on its face, was clear and
unambiguous.' 53 The Henkel court found that the will had been properly executed
and submitted for probate and that the will had conferred a benefit upon the
intended beneficiary,'54 albeit less than the beneficiary asserted the testator
intended. 55
Thus, as courts following the Florida-Iowa rule have held, the mere fact that the
magnitude of the benefit is not what the beneficiary anticipated does not give that
frustrated beneficiary a cause of action for legal malpractice; instead, the plaintiff
must show that the drafting attorney's negligence frustrated the testator's intent as
expressed in the will.156
VII. CONCLUSION

When a South Carolina appellate court decides the issue of whether an intended
beneficiary has standing to bring an action against an attorney for negligent will
drafting, South Carolina will probably adopt the Florida-Iowa rule. Although strict
adherence to the testator's expressed intent in the will may preclude actions against
some attorneys who where truly negligent in preparing the instrument, the "fourcomers" approach under the Florida-Iowa rule does not throw open the doors of the
courtroom to every frustrated or disappointed beneficiary by eroding the privity

151. See, e.g., Belt v. Oppenheimer, Blend, Harrison & Tate, Inc., 192 S.W.3d 780, 783 (Tex.
2006) ("[l]n Texas, a legal malpractice claim in the estate-planning context may be maintained only by
the estate planner's client.").
152. See, e.g., Conti v. Polizzotto, 663 N.Y.S.2d 293, 294 (App. Div. 1997) ("The plaintiffs'
status as beneficiaries of that will, and their mere claim that they instructed the [attorneys] to draft the
instrument in accordance with the decedent's expressed intentions, fail to suggest the existence between
the parties of the type of relationship necessary to sustain this [legal malpractice] action.").
153. Henkel, 346 S.C. at 19, 550 S.E.2d at 579 ("Because the will was properly executed and
probated, we find that Wife cannot establish that Husband's intent was anything other than as expressed
in his will.").
154. ld. at 18, 550 S.E.2d at 579.
155. Id. at 16, 550 S.E.2d at 578.
156. See DeMaris v. Asti, 426 So. 2d 1153, 1154 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983); Schreiner v. Scoville,
410 N.W.2d 679, 683 (Iowa 1987).
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requirement to a point of uncertainty. Allowing intended beneficiaries to bring legal
malpractice actions where the drafting attorney's negligence frustrated testator's
intent as expressed in the will and rendered the will ineffective, will provide a
remedy for frustrated beneficiaries without invading or adversely affecting the
province of the attorney-client relationship.
Max N. Pickelsimer
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